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T ranshumanism and Catholic Natural Law: 
Changing Human Nature and Changing 
Moral Norms 1 
Brian Patrick Green 
Natural law ethics derives moral norms from human nature. Transhumanism 
seeks to change human nature. So, could transhumanism change the norms 
of natural law? And if so, how, why, and in which ways? Natural law ethics 
is one of the major ethical approaches used in Catholic Christianity. Natural 
law rests on the fundamental ax iom that agere sequitur esse-that is, "action 
fo llows being." In other words, by knowing what something is (its nature) , 
we can know something about how it should act (its ethics). Natura l law's 
theological assumptions include the idea that nature as a whole is God's good 
creation and that the natures of particular creatures manifest divine provi-
dence. Beings sh ould act in accord with their natures because, in following 
God's providence, doing so leads toward virtuous excellence and happiness. 
Contemporary natural law h as been considered by several major schools of 
thought, including rationalist and physicalist interpretations. 
T ranshumanism's proponents argue that we sh ould change humans into 
technologically enhanced forms with powers that normal humans do not 
have. For example, humans could be genetically or cybernetically enhanced 
to be smarter or stronger. Some transhumanist thinkers even propose "upload-
ing" the human mind into a computer, thereby freeing humanity from 
embodiment and its limits. An uploaded mind could theoretically trave l 
across space through computer networks or duplicate itself at will. We already 
have humans who can control computers with their thoughts, and computers 
that can provide input into human brains. What if researchers created an ani-
mal or human with a largely or completely artificial brain? How much artificial 
brain would be enough to qualify one as "transhuman" ? These issues call into 
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question the connection between mind and matter, and much that is built 
upon this connection, including Catholic natural law. If something as basic 
as the connection between mind and matter were altered in humans, how 
would this affect human nature? And how would natural law theory deal with 
these changes? 
In this chapter I propose a preliminary response to the transhumapist chal-
lenge to natural law by investigating six basic questions: ( 1) Is human nature 
relevant to morality? (2) Is human nature mutable? (3) How would we know 
if human nature had changed? ( 4) Could cultural evolution replace biological 
evolution? (5) How would human nature and human will relate to each other 
under these new transhuman conditions? (6) Is it possible to construct a 
dynamic ethic to fit a dynamic nature, and if so, what might that ethic be? 
Overall, I argue that it is possible to maintain a natural law ethics approach 
in the face of transhumanist changes to human nature and that, in fact, doing 
so remains a very useful approach, albeit one with some difficulties. The norms 
of natural law are another matter: I think moral norms will need to become 
either stricter than in the past or different in ways that are difficult to anticipate. 
This chapter concentrates on the philosophy and theology of the 13th-
century Roman Catholic saint, Thomas Aquinas, who developed Aristotle's 
ideas in a Christian context. Aquinas's claims that action follows being and 
that human nature is a composite of first nature and second nature are com-
bined with ideas from the philosopher Hans Jonas about the increasing scope 
of human action and the consequent necessity to update ethics. I propose that 
there a new form of natural law ethics might be capable of resp onding to 
changes in human nature. 
IS NATU RE RELEVANT TO MORALITY? 
The idea that nature is relevant to morality has a long history, dating back 
at least to Aristotle. Nevertheless, many philosophers of the modem and con-
temporary periods have disagreed with Aristotle. For example, David Hume's 
"is-ought" dichotomy, sometimes called Hume's law, says that "one cannot 
derive an 'ought' from an 'is,'" which, of course, is exactly what most forms 
of natural law ethics try to do. 2 Natural law, then, might sound like a non-
starter for contemporary ethical analysis, which has for many decades taken 
Hume's law for granted. However, due to the rejuvenation of virtue ethics, 
there has been a growing movement to reject the is-ought dichotomy and 
reassert the moral relevance of nature. This movement includes such diverse 
thinkers as Larry Arnhart, William Casebeer, Terrence Deacon, Daniel 
Dennett, Philippa Foot, Hans Jonas, Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, 
and Joan Roughgarden.3 
How, then, should we understand the relationship between the "is" of 
nature and the "ought" of ethics? Aristotle grounded his ethics in natural 
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teleology, and Alasdair MacIntyre argues persuasively in After Virtue that 
there is no way to do ethics without at least some sense of telos. MacIntyre 
resolves the is-ought problem by restoring teleology to ethics. He articulates 
the connection between ethics and teleology within a three-part structure: 
"untutored human nature, man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos and 
the moral precepts which enable him to pass from one state to the other."4 
In other words, ethics mediates both nature and telos. To achieve a purpose, 
one must move from beginning to end by taking certain actions that delineate 
the path between these two places. These delineating actions are ethics. 
Modernity, informed by Hume and others,5 removed the sense of normative 
goal seeking in human nature, thereby leaving the "nature-ethics-telos" system 
corrupted because it had no telos-no purpose for human life, no concept of 
excellence and flourishing. The system then becomes only the "is" of nature 
and an ethics with no point, which quickly yields a disbelief in ethics (since 
it seems pointless), and finally only science and technology remain. 
By taking the teleological perspective, we can see that nature is very much 
relevant to ethics because all creatures naturally seek certain ends. For exam-
ple, plants naturally seek light and animals naturally seek food. For these enti-
ties, seeking these things constitutes a purpose and a good. While these are 
natural goods, they become moral goods in humanity because we are con-
scious, rational agents with free will and have a reflective power to perceive 
these goods and to choose for or against them. For example, for humans, 
health and learning are goods that we naturally seek. In our actions we can 
choose for or against these goods-for example, by eating well or poorly, or 
by practicing skills or not. In choosing for or against these goods, we make 
moral choices insofar as we benefit or harm our health or develop or stunt 
our learning. We may choose, if freedom grants us the opportunity, to become 
more fully flourishing humans; likewise, by our choices we may choose the 
opposite. Of paramount importance here is simply the point that these natural 
goods exist, and that they are relevant for morality. 
IS HUMAN NATURE MUTABLE? 
The next question is whether human nature is mutable, and if so, in which 
ways and to what degree? If human nature is mutable, then the ethics derived 
from it may have to change as human nature changes. While contemporary 
postmodernism, feminism, and evolutionary theory tend to be anti-
essentialist and take human mutability as a given, this tends not to be the case 
with natural law theory. 
In the Summa Theologiae, following the ancient philosophers, Aquinas 
divides human nature into first nature and second nature. 6 First nature is the 
part of us that we share universally with all other humans. In modem terms, 
first nature would be what metaphysically and biologically makes us members 
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of the species Homo sapiens. First nature is also something over which we have 
historically had little or no voluntary control. 
Second nature, by comparison, is more open. It is not universal. It varies 
between groups over geography and history, and in individuals over their life-
times. It can be thought of as culture, as expressed in the group and the indi-
vidual. The processes of acquiring culture are enculturation (or socialization) 
and habituation. For example, children learn to speak the language to which 
they are culturally exposed, but may develop particular good or bad habits 
when speaking. Most importantly, we possess some measure of voluntary con-
trol over second nature and so are responsible for our individual virtues 
and vices. 
I think Aquinas is being a bit too simple by separating human nature into 
only two parts. Arguably, first nature and second nature could be further sep-
arated into metaphysical first nature (pertaining to human being and identity 
as, for example, "rational animals") and biological first nature (pertaining to 
our biology-for example, as genetic organisms with metabolism and physiol-
ogy), and cultural second nature (pertaining to our culture-for example, our 
language) and individual second nature (pertaining to our personal habits-
for example, mumbling). The distinction between metaphysical and biologi-
cal first nature is especially important to this discussion. 
In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas argues that the general principles of 
natural law (i.e., those derived from our first nature) cannot vary between 
human gro~ps because the principles are universal to all humans. In contrast, 
the particular determinations of natural law will vary between groups because 
they are more context dependent. 7 For example, in another culture, what we 
would call "stealing" might be more like "borrowing" or "giving." If the social 
expectations of the group are not the same, the specific behavioral norms will 
likewise be different. 
To summarize, second nature is variable and the morals of different cultures 
can legitimately vary in limited ways according to the specifics of their social 
and physical environment. Translating Aquinas into the more modern par-
lance used by Jean Porter, we might say that humans are underdetermined.8 
Our biological inclinations are insufficient to guide our behavior, so our cul-
tures take up the genetic slack and guide our behavior through moral codes.9 
For example, by nature humans will pick up a language, but culture deter-
mines which one. Morally speaking, by nature humans will desire food, but 
by culture we are told what is good or not good to eat (e.g., is meat permis-
sible?) and how we are allowed to get it (e.g., not by stealing). Not every moral 
code will work; cultures are selected by natural selection just as biological 
organisms are. 10 Societies that do not function well either adapt or are 
replaced. Adaptation relies on mutation, whether biological or cultural, which 
raises our central question: is human nature mutable? 
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The answer for second nature is clearly "yes." Human cultural nature is 
mutab le, as cultures vary widely over space and time. The answer for first 
nature was formerly "no" (excluding the issue of the very slow changes due 
to biological evolution), but is now becoming "yes," at least for biological first 
nature (and possibly for metaphysical first nature). Furthermore, first nature is 
growing in mutability with technological advances. 
Medicine is a major field in which technology has led to dramatic changes in 
human life, and it provides a clear case study of how human nature has changed. 
Medicine is a manifestation of second nature specifically directed at the control 
of biological first nature. This cultural phenomenon has dramatically changed 
human health, especially lifespan and reproductive behavior. As medicine 
advances, more and more of first nature will come under the control of second 
nature. This shift goes beyond medicine into many ocher fields. 
The scope of human power has grown through the growth of technology. 
This is a key point: if action follows being, and human action has changed, 
then our being may have changed as well. I say "may have" because there 
remain relevant questions regarding act and potency, as well as oncology and 
epistemology, as discussed in the next section. 
Human biological first nature and second nature are now mutable not only 
through biological and cultural evolution, but more particularly through the 
application of technology. Technology can act not only on our second nature, 
in our culture, but also now on our biological first nature. Humans have inde-
terminacy (freedom) built into our biological nature chat allows us to acquire a 
culture, which then completes us. In other words, our biology needs culture or 
we are incomplete. Our freedom necessitates that we have a culture with 
moral nonns because we are not programmed by instinct as deterministically 
as other animals are. As our technological power grows, including power over 
our biological nature, our indeterminacy will grow with it. More of our behav-
ior will then become subject to free will rather than necessity; thus the realm 
of morality will grow as well. This is what has happened in the last few decades 
with new technologies. For example, advances in reproductive technology 
have forced us to ask whether conception via donor gametes and pregnancy 
via gestational surrogacy are morally good. 
Human second nature is growing in scope relative to human biological first 
nature. Our scope of voluntary action has increased, and with it our power and 
freedom. If action and being are related, then as technology increases our 
scope for action, what we are as beings may be changing. On the scala natura, 
the Great Chain of Being, despite our materiality, perhaps we are no longer 
quite so close to the animals and are now a bit closer to the angels-we have 
clawed our way up a little bit. With the flip of a switch hundreds of millions 
can be killed in a nuclear war, and by polluting the atmosphere we can warm 
the earth. These are not the actions of simple apes; they are the actions 
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of creatures more akin to minor deities. This is a true novelty of history, albeit 
a very dangerous one. Thus we have immense power with inadequate ethics; 
we have an ethics for apes, but not demigods. 
Jonas makes this point earlier in non-Thomistic terms in his book 
The Imperative of Responsibility. In his first chapter, Jonas asserts that "the 
nature of human action has changed" over time due to our growth in techno-
logical power; since ethics concerns action, the nature of ethics must change 
as well. 11 Jonas lists some ways in which ethics must change to fit the contem-
porary context. Ethics, he says, must consider the vulnerability of pature to 
human action. Our ethical actions are now aggregate (collective of all our 
actions), irreversible (as in extinction of species), and cumulative (effects 
build up over time) . Unlike in the past, when actions were more discrete, with 
global civilization consequences now compound both spatially and tempo-
rally, and future effects are unpredictable. Ethical decision making must take 
this unpredictability into account. This leads to Jonas's "imperative of respon-
sibility": "'Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the per-
manence of genuinely human life'; or expressed negatively: 'Act so that the 
effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such 
life.' "12 
Technological second nature is growing to encompass biological first 
nature. Human nature has never been stationary; it has always been evolving, 
but what was once a crawl has accelerated. If action follows being, and our 
capacity for action has changed, then this implies that our being may h ave 
changed as well. 
HOW WOULD WE KNOW IF HUMAN NATURE 
HAD CHANGED? 
At the simplest level, if transhumanism succeeds in changing humans, then 
natural law dictates that these new creatures could have different mora l 
requirements than do current humans. From a Thomistic perspective, if an 
entity dramatically changes its behavior, it has not necessarily changed its sub-
stantial form, but is merely actualizing potencies that it already possessed , as 
when a caterpillar changes into a butterfly. But in what sense could this be 
true for transhumans, who might technologically modify their bodies or 
attempt to upload their consciousness? While in a physical sense action fol -
lows being, in an epistemological sense being follows action. We can classify 
what something is by what it does. In reversing the axiom, a being is known 
through its actions. 
If transhumans obtain new powers for action, we might have to classify 
them as possessing different natures from current humans and as having differ-
ent ethical expectations. Whether a reclassification of being is necessary is the 
crux of the problem: will transhumans be new beings or just plain old humans 
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actualizing latent potencies? Furthermore, how do biology and metaphysics 
relate on this question? How far must second nature grow into first nature 
before biology is completely absorbed? And what do these human changes 
mean metaphysically? Because ethical responsibility is proportional to the 
capacity to ace, if transhumans became, for example, extraordinarily strong 
or smart, they would become more culpable for their actions and failures 
to ace, or in religious terms, for their sins of commission and omission. 
We already have this moral expectation for the powerful, of course, so is this 
really a change? 
In considering morality, a definition of human nature chat includes our 
potential for action is appropriate, because it reflects the axiom that action fol-
lows being. However, including this element in a definition of human nature 
does create a problem: humans are already capable of vastly different actions 
than we were in past times. So are we already transhumans? 
As mentioned earlier, Jonas argues that humans have, through technology, 
already expanded our scope of action and, therefore, we muse expand the 
scope of our ethics. 13 Applying this idea to natural law, if our scope of action 
has changed over history due to culture, then perhaps our being (as bioculcur-
ally composite creatures) has in some sense changed as well. Deeper investiga-
tion into chis point ( which is not possible here) requires examining the 
relationships between efficient causality and substantial form, biology and cul-
ture, the individual and society, and potency and being. 
Compared to our ancestors, our biology is nearly the same, but technologi-
cally speaking, our capacity to act is vastly different. Relative to the ancients, 
we perform magic. The ancients did not need to worry about the ethics of 
human cloning, nuclear war, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, space explo-
ration, or artificial intelligence. Moreover, they never had to entertain the 
question of whether they should-or have-become transhumans. But we 
do. We have far greater potential for action than did our ancestors. 
T ranshumanists are simply pursuing this trajectory with intention and inten-
sity. Where does quantity change quality? Where does biology become meta-
physics? Where do we cross the threshold between actualizing potentials we 
have always had and becoming new kinds of beings? We know this transition 
seems to have already happened to humanity once in the past, when we tran-
sitioned from ape to human. Will it happen again if we transition from human 
to transhuman? 
Different schools of natural law will vary in how they understand transhu-
mans to be "different" from humans. Rationalist natural law theorists might 
find transhumans to be no different at all from normal humans because both 
possess a rational faculty that is understood as the seat of moral relevance. 14 
In contrast, physicalist natural law theorists might find transhumans and regu-
lar humans to be very different, because the body itself has normative celeolo-
gies built into it. 15 For now, these schools of natural law are in disagreement 
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on many issues, such as sexuality, precisely because humans have gained tech-
nological control of reproduction like never before. These disagreements will 
grow and spread into new fields of inquiry as technology continues to increase 
our control over human nature. 
COULD CULTURAL EVOLUTION REPLACE 
BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION? 
Humans are bioculturally composite creatures; will transhumans also be? 
As technology grows in power over biology, will it eventually edge biology 
out entirely? Will second nature come to completely absorb first nature, pre-
cisely as brain "uploaders" desire to do, living free of biological substrate ? 
In these extreme scenarios, biological evolution ceases and cultural evolution 
becomes the sole form of transhuman evolution. 
How would natural law operate in a purely cultural system, with no biologi-
cal "nature" to determine ethics? Would natural law become completely rela-
tivized? Up until now human nature has always implied at least some 
foundational biology. But perhaps even purely cultural/technological creatures 
will still have a metaphysical first nature (e.g., reason and will). Perhaps these 
traditional. categories, which distinguish us from the rest of the animals, will be 
enhanced, or perhaps other categories added. 
The schools of natural law theory would engage this situation differently. 
Rationalist natural law would likely see uploaded transhumans as still being 
essentially human or at least person, given that they consider the morally rel-
evant aspect of human nature to be mental. In Christianity, rationality and 
personhood are not exclusively human traits: we share these traits with God, 
and the angels and demons-and so perhaps we could share them with non-
biological transhumans, too. Transhumans would be a new category of 
rational creatures, similar to humans by existing in physical matter, but unlike 
humans in that matter is a nonbiological artifact. As long as transhumans 
remained rational, rationalist natural law might not need to be fundamentally 
revised. 
Conversely, physicalist natural law theorists would likely see uploaded 
transhumans as essentially different from normal humans because the 
uploaded entities would lack a biological body in which the biological parts 
have intrinsic teleologies. Instead, transhumans incorporating (or substitut-
ing) hardware into or for their beings would be radically physically underde-
termined and morphologically open, even if they shared a continuity of 
mind with humans. Some physicalist natural law theorists might conclude 
that these transhumans share very little essential nature with humans or no 
longer have an essential nature, as they might change the physical aspects of 
their nature at will. Moral evaluation would be related to the full range of 
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possible actions, thereby greatly expanding moral responsibility-in Jesus's 
d " h h . . h . d »16 wor s, to w om muc ts given, muc 1s expecte . 
HOW WOULD HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN WILL 
RELATE UNDER CONDITIONS OF RADICALLY 
MANIPULABLE NATURE? 
Recalling the argument made by MacIntyre, ethics mediates nature and 
tel.as. Nature is our origin, tel.as our destiny, and ethics the way to move from 
the first to the second. But transhumans may have very different natures, 
and their destinies (bracketing out their supernatural ones) will be subject to 
their own choices. Does ethics become meaningless when origin and destiny 
are both subject to human will? Or does ethics merely become the subjective 
judgment of the individual transhuman, who is capable of shifting morpholo-
gies and teleologies at will? 
For natural law to work, the entelechies (the built-in natural purposes or 
telei) of creatures must be known. Being determines action because natural 
being is intrinsically teleological-nature aims toward something. If we can 
determine that transhumans still have a natural entelechy, then their ethics 
could be read from their natures, not their wills. 
Most likely, the telei of these new creatures will be survival and flourishing, 
as are the telei for all life. But what is "flourishing" for transhumans? Natural 
law ethics posits some clear criteria for flourishing, presupposing the mandate 
that human will should be subordinated to nature, which expresses God's 
providence. In our individualist and authority-resisting contemporary culture, 
higher authorities are often rejected, and subjective will becomes the measure 
of right and wrong, yielding a world of relativized morals. Under this relativis-
tic ethic, nature and tel.as are subject to will, and morality would be whatever 
transhumans decide it to be. In most schools of natural law, in contrast, indi-
vidual will does not actually affect one's telos. In other words, individual 
expressivist self-actualization-a driving force behind transhumanism-would 
attract little consideration in the moral evaluations of most types of natural 
law. For example, one transhuman might desire enhanced mental capacities 
to pursue theoretical mathematics, but a natural law evaluation might con-
clude that this mental power instead ought to be used for helping the poor. 
But let us not too hastily dismiss transhumanist aspirations as immoral 
abuses of the human will over nature. Some transhumans might want to help 
the poor. In our capacities to act, we are already at some distance from the 
ancients, and transhumanists are merely pursuing this historical trajectory. 
Power applied to nature is not intrinsically immoral. Rather, power just gives 
us more indeterminacy of action and need for our will to guide us in places 
where our nature formerly did. The questions are how far to go and whether 
human nature is changed. 
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Aquinas identifies five inclinations in human nature: survive, reproduce, 
educate the young, live in society, and seek truth. Transhumanists might not 
share all these inclinations as they have been traditionally understood.17 For 
example, they may not need to reproduce biologically. They may just need 
to copy themselves electronically, thereby eliminating the need for education 
as well. Would their lack of need to fulfill this basic human inclination be 
"evil" or just unnecessary? Because they could have different natures, these 
inclinations might simply n o longer apply to them. Whether transhumans 
would live in society is an open question. If they did not, then survival and 
truth seeking might be the only inclinations transhumanists have in common 
with regular humans. One could even survive without truth seeking ( whatever 
"truth" might mean to transhumans), especially if one had sufficient entertain-
ment. In contrast to a flourishing human society that fulfills these fi ve inclina-
tions, might a flourishing transhuman simply be one who is surviving and 
being entertained? 
How would will and nature relate for transhumans? Will would be elevated 
to the level of a force of nature, like evolution, because will would have con-
trol over the transhuman's own nature. Transhumans would create themselves 
in their own images. Transhuman nature could become so malleab le that 
nothing of biology is left, only cultural artifact and "being" itself, easily extin-
guished by willing suicide. This radically underdetennined nature would leave 
vast spaces for exploration by the human will. With open fields for origin 
(nature) and destiny (telos), ethics-at least natural law ethics-becomes very 
vague indeed. 
Rationalistic natural law, similar to Kantianism, might still make sense in 
this context. Physicalist natural law, by comparison, would be very challenged 
to deal with this indeterminacy of nature. Kantian and utilitarian ethics might 
actually be more appropriate for transhumans than virtue ethics or natural law 
would, since under conditions of radical will and indeterminacy, h abi ts of 
action and nature might become reduced. Theoretically, transhumans could 
be designed as non-habit-forming, purely rational, purely pleasure-seeking, or 
otherwise quite different beings from current humans. In turn, transhuman 
ethics might resemble contemporary attempts to create ethical codes for 
robots, especially military robots programmed with rules of engagement. 
Due to the peculiarities of our own neurophysiology, humans might be best 
suited to natural law and virtue ethics. However, robots, or analogo4sly struc-
tured transhumans, having rather different natures (as entities programmed to 
follow rules), could find Kantianism and utilitarianism workable ethical sys-
tems. W ould this make them more capable of wielding power responsibly, 
more vulnerable to strange errors of programming, or simply more alien and 
inscrutable? 
Anthropologist Terrence Deacon, in a different context ( the determinacy 
of brain plasticity), has called humanity "the degenerate ape," because we 
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need culture to complete our biology. 18 T ranshumanism seeks to extend this 
evolutionary trend toward lack of natural specificity and toward indetermi-
nacy. In Thomistic/Aristotelian terms, the movement of the transhuman 
toward potency and away from actuality is not necessarily a gain in ontological 
stature, but instead could be a reduction. It can be interpreted as movement 
toward the feralness and wildness of indeterminacy, and away from being like 
God, who is actuality (Being) itself. In Aristotelian terms, the transhuman, in 
gaining power and reducing determinacy of action, tends toward nothingness 
instead of existence, because prime matter is pure potency, pure power, but 
with no actuality. Prime matter is, in fact, nothing at all-it does not exist. 
God, in contrast, is pure being, existence itself, pure act. 
In exploring the power of the will, indeterminacy, and movements toward 
and away from God, it may be helpful to recall the story of the Garden of 
Eden and the Fall. In the story, humans grasp at what seems good, only to 
have it ultimately very seriously harm us. The power to "know" or to think 
that one knows and decides good and evil-to be indeterminate and free of 
limits, whether in the human or transhuman case-can be interpreted as mak-
ing us worse off we are. ls transhumanism merely continuing the Fall? By choos-
ing to "improve" upon nature, one effectively denies the goodness of God's 
providence. God then becomes at best an unfamiliar question lost in the noise 
of power and at worst an adversary to be opposed at all costs. When one believes 
that one has become a god, what use is belief in a higher God? Yet how can one 
stand the idea that a higher God may yet exist that remains unattainable to the 
lower god that one is? The only solution is to pursue yet more power, in a never-
ending quest to make the snake's lie true. Regarding this pursuit, God rightly asks 
has humanity gone astray, "Where are you?"19 As we endeavor to make ourselves 
more like God, we simply slip further away. 
A DYNAMIC ETHIC FOR A DYNAMIC NATURE 
Given the possibility of this Edenic danger, what are humans to do? 
Practically speaking, the fruit is too tempting; it will be seized. After all, with 
the discovery of nakedness after the fall, technology (clothing) seemed the 
automatic response. What can be done to mitigate the dangers that will come 
with seizing this power and indeterminacy? What should be our new ethic? 
First, we need to know ourselves. We can do this by synthesizing data and 
theory from psychology, anthropology, and evolutionary biology, as well as 
history, culture, and the humanities. This is not a task with a clear conclusion. 
We will not get a perfect idea of human nature, only a "good enough" idea-
and even then, differing conclusions will be possible. 
We also need to think about our human telos. What is the human telos? As 
mentioned earlier, Aquinas supplies five basics: survive, reproduce, educate 
the young, live in society, and seek truth. A functioning society that fulfills 
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these bare minima has achieved a minimal telos. Beyond that, fulfilling them 
virtuously is the next step, culminating for those humanistically inclined 
with the good political community, and for those theologically inclined, 
with God. 
With nature (as found by science) and telos (as found by philosophy) in 
hand, and despite the likelihood of continuing disagreements between fac-
tions, we can return to theological ethics-specifically, the virtues necessary 
to pass from nature to telos, from who we are to who we are meant to be. 
For the near future, at least, these virtues will be similar to the ones we already 
know, but with expanded scope for action and, therefore, responsibility. 
For example, for the sake of prudence we will need not only to look to our 
actions here and now, but also to seek the good in our collective actions over 
long periods of time. Conversely, our vices will become more destructive. 
In the past, gluttony was merely stuffing oneself with food; now, with fertilizers 
and feedlots, we first fatten our corn, then our cattle, and finally ourselves, in a 
growing cascade of consumption. 
Likewise, notions of sin will need expansion to match the expanded scope 
of potential for sin. Sins of commission will likely become more or less serious 
depending on at least two factors. They will become more serious as our power 
makes us more capable of committing gravely wrong acts. Also, as our knowl-
edge of the effects of our actions grow, we will become more responsible for 
our sins because we ought to know better. Conversely, our sins of commission 
may become less serious because the effects of our actions will become less pre-
dictable (especially in aggregate and cumulative form), therefore lowering our 
culpability (although we ought to anticipate this unpredictability and plan 
accordingly), at least until we realize what we are doing (as has occurred with 
knowledge of anthropogenic climate change). Similarly, as the effects of our 
collective acts become clearer to us, every act may end up becoming mildly 
evil, including, for example, eating and driving. Sins of omission will become 
more serious as well, because in our expanded power, failure to act makes us 
more responsible for the evils we fail to prevent. 
What are the potential new directions for natural law ethics in this 
dynamic context? Based on the discussion in this chapter, I suggest three 
needs for a future natural law ethic. First, we should watch human nature 
itself, particularly human potential for action. Because action follows being, 
as our potential for action changes, our being may be changing as well. 
Second, we should keep our eyes on the minimal telei: survival, reproduction, 
education, living in society, and seeking truth. Without these guideposts, we 
will not know where to direct our moral efforts. Third, if ethics is a journey 
from nature to telos, from origin to destiny, then as the metaphorical locations 
of our natures and telei change, we will need new maps and routes to proceed 
from origin to destiny. This is ethics like space travel, where both origin and 
destination are in motion, so the course must be set with great care. 
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As we proceed on this journey, Hans Jonas's imperative of responsibility-
to protect the very possibility of morality itself, by protecting the existence 
of humanity from existential dangers-should be our first commandment. 
Our second commandment, as Jonas notes, should be to live well-that is, 
to live morally flourishing lives. 20 This goal requires that we look for new 
dangers to avoid as well as for new opportunities for new goods to pursue. 
The idea that action follows being, combined with our modem technology 
changing our scope of action, means that human nature may be changing, and 
that ethical norms should also change. Natural law's particular norms may be 
unstable, yet this will not likely loosen the strictures of natural law's norms, 
making more things permissible (as we grow in power). Rather, it will necessi-
tate that norms be tightened as our power grows, forbidding more actions, lest 
we cause unimaginable harms. Ultimately, words like "looser" and "tighter" 
may just be misleading; ethical norms might simply need to be different, as 
befits creatures with different natures. 
CONCLUSION 
When considering how transhumanism and natural law ethics relate and 
whether transhumanism will force changes in natural law theory, the answers 
to the questions depend on what one means by "natural law." If one means the 
approach itself, then no, it will remain immutable; action will always follow 
being, and ethics can always be based on that, no matter how indeterminate 
nature may become or how relatively useless (given that indeterminacy) the 
method may become. Conversely, if by natural law one means the normative 
conclusions of natural law, then these will indeed change in their specifics, 
depending on just how different transhumans become (as Jonas asserts that 
human norms already should have changed). Individual schools of natural 
law will also need to adapt differently to various transhumanist manipulations, 
with rationalist natural law adapting more easily than its physicalist 
counterpart. 
Aquinas never had to worry about what the implications of changing 
human nature would mean for natural law, so he never had to think about 
what to do if human nature actually did start changing. We no longer have 
that luxury; we need to figure out what to do or we may accidentally destroy 
ourselves and devastate the earth. Anthropogenic global warming and nuclear 
weapons are symptoms of this power without thought, and nanotechnology, 
synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, and other technologies are fast join-
ing that list. We seek these powers because we find God's providence insuffi-
cient, but is the insufficiency in God or in ourselves, in our own choices and 
second natures gone astray? How we answer that question may determine 
how sympathetic we will be toward transhumanism. Transhumanism, at the 
very least, presents incredible thought experiments for ethical theorists, 
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but as we continue to grow in power some of these thoughts will- become 
realities. · 
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